

**SECRET**

29 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary and Deputy Secretary  
of Defense, 28 January 1980 [redacted]

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1. Only the Deputy Secretary was present for the entire meeting;  
Secretary Brown came in late. [redacted]

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2. The Secretary raised the issue of the possibility of Soviet use  
of chemical warfare in Afghanistan. He was inclined to play this in low  
key at this time since our evidence was rather thin. He indicated they  
had deliberately leaked the possibility of its use. [redacted]

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I promised to send Deputy Secretary Claytor a copy of the memo  
I read the other day summarizing our views on this subject and concluding  
that we had only two reports from a source that had been unreliable in the  
past. [redacted]

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3. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation of our support for  
their program on preemptive releases. I emphasized that we were all for  
it as long as intelligence equities were well considered.

I note in the last paragraph of the Brown terms of reference  
for the new group it says that release will only be made after comments  
are received from the head of the intelligence agency who produced the  
report. That's fine, but I think we ought to add to that "and the DCI"  
since the DCI is responsible for all sources and methods. [redacted]

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25X1 4. The Deputy Secretary indicated that they didn't think the SCC subcommittee under Schechter for publicizing what the Soviets were doing in Afghanistan or the problems of the hostages in Iran, etc., was active enough. I said I fully agreed and would work with them to prod it more. ☐

25X1 5. Secretary Brown raised a concern with NIE 11-3/8. We show a range of possible outcomes in number of Soviet warheads if the Soviets adhere to the SALT limitations (the one RV versus ten RV issue). We do not show any range for the no-SALT cases. The Secretary is concerned that this gives an impression that we are more confident of the no-SALT numbers than we are of the SALT numbers. Of course that is not the case in fact. We should look either at putting a shaded area on those curves or some words in the text to emphasize that there are considerable uncertainties here, but that the range of uncertainties cannot be as easily defined as that under SALT. ☐

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7. We discussed the intelligence initiative legislation in considerable detail.

I failed to ask him if there were any special things we ought to try to get through for DIA at this time. I'd like a tickler to raise that again with General Tighe and with Admiral Inman. I wonder if this might be a moment to ask if they couldn't have the same exceptions from Civil Service hiring rules that we do. ☐ *> Tickler made*

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25X1 9. I gave him the articles by Jim Stockdale. ☐

10. The solid propellant issue didn't come up. ☐

☐ *for*  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

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